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Abstract: 
In recent years, an overly narrow focus on rebound effects has limited the extent of researcher and 
policy attention afforded to the wider multiple benefits of increased energy efficiency. The objective 
of this paper is to focus policy attention on the sustained added value to the economy that is created 
as result of improving energy efficiency in the residential sector. Governments around the world are 
committed to increasing energy efficiency more generally, but often focus public support in low 
income households where energy poverty is a particular concern. However, governments operate in 
a context of multiple objectives where energy efficiency is expected to deliver significant reductions 
in carbon emissions alongside sustainable economic development. We use a UK CGE model to 
consider the general effects of supporting increases in energy efficiency in residential energy use. Our 
results demonstrate that the increase in GDP, and economic activity more generally, triggered by 
increased energy efficiency delivers more in terms of increased household incomes than the efficiency 
improvement itself.  We find that the more wide ranging the boost to energy efficiency, the greater 
the economic expansion and associated returns are likely to be, and the less the means of financing 
through public budgets will erode the benefits over time. 
 
Key words: energy efficiency, energy demand, fuel poverty, multiple benefits, general 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years the literature on the wider economic impacts of energy efficiency improvements has 
tended to focus on the issue of rebound effects. In particular, rebound studies have mainly focussed 
on measuring direct and indirect (re-spending) rebound effects using microeconomic or limited 
input-output economy-wide models (see for example Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015; Druckman, et al. 2011;  
Freire-Gonzáles, 2011). Where different household income groups are identified, emphasis has 
tended to be placed on how rebound effects that are driven by changes in real income following an 
energy efficiency improvement will be bigger the larger the share of total income that is spent on 
energy consumption (Chitnis et al., 2014; Murray 2013; Thomas and Azevedo, 2013). 
However, certainly in colder climates like that of the UK, where lower income households tend to 
spend a larger share of their income on energy (Office for National Statistics, 2011, 2012, 2013), there 
are concerns over energy or fuel poverty (UK DECC, 2015).1 This both raises a challenge for the 
rebound-focussed literature, in that direct rebound effects triggered by lower energy costs may in fact 
be a true representation of required demand (to adequately heat properties), and focuses attention 
on the nature of socio-economic returns from increased energy efficiency.  
The latter point reflects the multiple benefits of energy efficiency argument proposed by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014). In particular the current paper focuses attention on the 
sustained added value to the economy that is created as result of investing in increased energy 
efficiency. We consider this in the context of a general equilibrium argument. That is, we propose 
that the increase in GDP and economic activity more generally that is triggered by increased energy 
efficiency (here in the household sector) delivers more in terms of energy poverty reduction than the 
efficiency improvement itself.2 This is through the additional return to household incomes as the 
economy expands. The larger and more wide-ranging the boost to household energy efficiency, the 
greater the economic expansion and associated returns are likely to be.  
We also consider a government funding argument, that public support should be directed at helping 
those less able to pay for energy efficiency improvements themselves. Specifically, we consider 
whether economic expansion triggered by more wide ranging support of energy efficiency 
programmes is likely to provide sufficient payback to justify greater levels of public support. This may 
also provide the basis for setting energy efficiency programmes in the context of a national 
infrastructure argument linked to improving the quality of a countrys domestic building stock. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent indirect and 
economy-wide rebound literature that has been the recent setting for considering the impacts of 
increased efficiency in household energy use. We focus on the extent to which wider economic 
expansionary and socio-economic arguments have been made. Section 3 then focuses attention on 
the policy context for identifying the issues outlined above, expanding on the multiple benefits, 
general equilibrium and public funding/national infrastructure arguments. Section 4 describes the UK 
CGE model that we use to consider the general effects that may be anticipated if energy efficiency 
increases in one or more household income groups in an economy. Section 5 details the simulation 
                                                          
1 In warmer climates, cooling may be a greater concern than heating. However, the expense of running air 
conditioning systems may deter low income households from investing in systems, so that expenditure on 
cooling does not manifest in economic statistics in the same way as energy poverty linked to heating.  
2 Note that in this paper we do not attempt to investigate impacts on precise measures of energy or fuel 
poverty currently adopted in the UK. At this stage, in our general analysis, we focus simply on whether the 
share of disposable income spent on energy goes up or down. 
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scenarios that are then implemented in Section 6, where we discuss our results. Finally, Section 7 
draws conclusions and considers policy implications. 
2. Existing literature on the wider impacts of energy efficiency  
In recent years a number of studies have analysed the impact of improved household energy efficiency 
using microeconomic demand systems, and input-output (IO) techniques. Their main focus has been 
the estimation of direct and indirect rebound effects (see for example Brännlund, et al. 2007; Chitnis 
and Sorrell, 2015; Druckman et al., 2011; Freire-Gonzáles, 2011; Lenzen and Dey, 2002; Mizobuchi, 
2008).   
More broadly, the main objective of this literature is to assess the effectiveness of energy efficiency, 
specifically in reducing energy use and CO2 emissions throughout the economy triggered by a 
reduction in final energy demand. For this reason, they estimate the rebound effect as a measure of 
the extent to which technically possible energy savings are eroded by economic responses.  
Some of these studies have estimated energy rebound effects by considering the impacts of energy 
efficiency and energy saving behavioural changes across different household income groups (Chitnis 
et al., 2014; Murray, 2013; Thomas and Azevedo, 2013). In this context, a common finding is that the 
lowest income groups tend to be associated with higher rebound effects. This is for two reasons. First, 
lower income groups tend to spend a larger share of their income on energy. Second, the price 
elasticity of demand for energy goods is generally higher when income is lower, indicating that lower 
income households are more responsive to changes in energy price (Chitnis et al., 2014). When the 
price of energy in efficiency units decreases, price elastic groups respond by consuming more energy.  
However, a key limitation of the approaches adopted in the aforementioned studies is to rely on 
models that implicitly or explicitly adopt the assumption of fixed market prices and nominal incomes. 
Such models are not able to capture the full set of economic responses triggered by an energy 
efficiency improvement that will occur as the economy adjusts to a new steady state with different 
spending and production decisions. Thus, they are limited in their capability to identify other potential 
benefits of energy efficiency (Brännlund et al., 2007; Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015; Lecca et al., 2014). 
Duarte et al. (2015), and Lecca et al. (2014) have estimated the impact of improving energy efficiency 
in household energy use using more flexible computable general equilibrium (CGE) models that 
incorporate IO data but permit the relaxation of the assumptions inherent in partial equilibrium and 
IO studies. Specifically, Lecca et al. (2014) takes the case of the UK and explores the value added of 
moving from a partial to a general equilibrium modelling framework (via an intermediate stage 
involving IO analysis) in the analysis of energy efficiency improvement. This is done by considering the 
impact of a 5% increase in household energy efficiency using models with different degrees of 
complexity calibrated on a common database.  
Lecca et al. (2014) initially estimate the direct rebound effect by estimating the elasticity of demand 
for energy goods and then derive the indirect (re-spending) rebound effects using IO techniques. They 
find that the indirect component of rebound is typically negative when the direct rebound is less than 
100% and the economy is characterised by energy sectors that are relatively energy intensive. In their 
UK case study, households decrease their demand for energy and reallocate spending towards less 
energy intensive non-energy goods, thereby reducing both direct energy use and energy embodied in 
supply chains supporting consumption demand. These net negative indirect effects persist when Lecca 
et al. (2014) derive the full economy-wide rebound using a CGE model. However, here the fuller 
economy-wide responses to the energy efficiency improvement are influenced by endogenous market 
price determination, nominal income and supply responses. This implies, for example, that the initial 
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drop in demand for energy decreases the market price of energy in the short-run, exacerbating the 
rebound effect by amplifying the decrease in the price of energy services (for any given market price), 
which may be considered as the effective price of energy. However, it also negatively influences the 
revenue and capacity decisions of energy producing firms and, over time, their output prices (i.e. 
countering decreases in both the effective and market price of energy). Moreover, the increase in 
demand for non-energy goods puts upward pressure on domestic consumption prices, negatively 
influencing competitiveness of UK industries. Nonetheless, overall the Lecca et al. (2014) results show 
a net expansion in the UK economy, with an increase in investment, employment and household 
spending. However, with a fixed national labour supply, depending on how households respond to the 
change in cost of living given by increased energy efficiency, a sustained increase in wages may give 
rise to a higher price level and reduced export demand. 
The Lecca et al. (2014) contribution helps to clarify the importance of analysing the full general 
equilibrium impacts of increased household energy efficiency. However, it is limited in only 
considering one single representative household, thereby not permitting any differentiation among 
household income groups. However, differences in the composition of both incomes and expenditures 
are likely to be crucial in influencing the distribution of the effects of economic adjustment across 
household income groups. Here, heterogeneity of households proves to be very important from a 
policy perspective. 
Duarte et al. (2015) also use a CGE model, this time for Spain to assess a range of energy-saving policies 
including increasing energy efficiency, but identifying four household income groups. They actually 
find that lower income household are less responsive to an energy efficiency improvement, and 
indeed are associated with lower rebound effects.3 However, the main point is that, although the 
focus of the work is on potential reduction of CO2 emissions, Duarte et al.s (2015) results also show 
that an energy efficiency improvement delivers an economic stimulus with a broader set of outcomes 
than reducing energy use.  
In general, though, much of the rebound literature neglects the wider range of potential economic 
benefits associated with increased energy efficiency that have been the focus of policy community 
contributions such as the IAE (2014) report. In response, this paper aims to add to the energy efficiency 
and CGE literature in filling this gap by exploring the wider impacts of household energy efficiency 
improvements in more detail, and to do so with specific focus on identifying different impacts among 
household income groups. In particular we focus on how support of energy efficiency programmes in 
the household sector may be justified through pay back delivered by macroeconomic expansion. 
3. Broadening focus for a multiple objectives policy context  
If we broaden focus from estimating rebound effects of increased energy efficiency more carefully to 
consider the processes that drive them, we implicitly turn attention to what has become known as the 
multiple benefits argument. While this specific terminology originates with the IEA (2014), arguments 
and evidence that energy efficiency will enhance economic welfare in a range of ways, including as a 
result of macroeconomic expansion, have been considered in other studies, notably (in terms of 
reflecting on the recent dominant focus on rebound effects) in the recent contribution by Gillingham 
et al. (2016).4  
                                                          
3 This may relate to the issue of cooling vs. heating and that in warmer climates, such as Spain, low income 
households cannot afford more electricity-intensive systems such as air conditioning. 
4 Chan and Gillingham (2015) also provide an analytical exposition of how rebound effects will have positive 
economic welfare implications at the microeconomic level.  
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In the current paper, we build on previous CGE studies of increased household energy efficiency to 
consider the wider economic impacts that fall under the multiple benefits umbrella. In particular, we 
focus on a general equilibrium argument that economic expansion will potentially deliver more in 
terms of individual household economic well-being than the initial improvement in energy efficiency. 
That is, when the economy expands (through increased investment, employment and output) as a 
result of increased and reallocated real household spending, increased incomes from employment of 
labour and capital services will further boost household incomes.5 In an energy poverty context, while 
the expansionary process will trigger further rebound in household use (as well as in the production 
sector of the economy), this must be set against increased household incomes (and benefits).  
Thus, one implication of this general equilibrium argument is that support of energy efficiency will 
deliver on more than just the outcome of reducing energy use (and related carbon emissions). Rather, 
by stimulating economic expansionary processes, it will further boost incomes throughout the 
economy and potentially deliver a level of pay back that would justify the public support required to 
allow the efficiency improvement to occur. 
However, it may be argued that macroeconomic expansion can be delivered through other policies 
and that, where energy efficiency policy requires the support of the public purse, focus should be on 
helping those households who are currently unable to heat6 their homes sufficiently. While the 
general equilibrium argument above implies that that the more wide-ranging the energy efficiency 
improvement, the greater will be the benefit to all households, it is necessary to consider whether 
restrictions on the government budget may erode the multiple benefits. That is, a government 
funding argument must also be considered. In the UK analysis below, we consider the context of a 
government that requires to maintain a fixed public sector deficit so that any support for energy 
efficiency programmes must be of a balanced-budget nature. That is to say that the funding for such 
programmes must come either from a reallocation of existing public spending or a change in tax 
revenues, at least in the short-term (until the costs of introducing the efficiency improvement have 
been recovered).  
The key issue, then, is whether the resulting expansion is still large enough to compensate for the 
impacts of falling government expenditure (in the areas where spending is reduced) or the distortions 
triggered by increasing tax rates in part(s) of the economy. In turn, this is again likely to depend on 
how extensive the efficiency improvement is and what type and level of spending activity (the trigger 
for demand-led expansion) occurs as a result of freed up (and increased) household (real) disposable 
incomes. If the efficiency improvement is limited to low income households, it must be recognised 
that these households are (a) a more limited source of spending power, and (b) less sensitive to the 
wage and capital incomes generated by economic expansion, given their greater dependence upon 
publicly funded benefits. Stimulating higher income households, on the other hand, may free up much 
more spending on non-energy goods and services and deliver greater benefits through increased wage 
and capital incomes.7   
                                                          
5 As we show in the CGE simulations reported in Section 6, where there is any constraint on the supply-side of 
the economy (e.g. restricted national labour supply) a demand-led expansion will put upward pressure on 
prices and potentially damage competitiveness. While this may benefit household incomes through higher 
wage rates, any loss in competitiveness will limit the extent of economic expansion over time. Where the 
expansion is triggered by increased energy efficiency this may be mitigated if households reflect the change in 
their cost of living in wage demands. However, we do not explore this issue at this stage. 
6 Or, in the context of warmer climates, to cool. 
7 Of course, in practice differences in propensities to consume and potential for further improvement in what 
may already be relatively energy efficient higher income homes (where efficiency in the use of luxury 
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This latter point may ultimately support a national infrastructure argument. If it can be shown that 
the economic stimulus generated by support of wider-ranging energy efficiency programmes is likely 
to deliver sufficient pay back to justify the initial levels of funding required, then arguments for 
strategic investment in energy efficiency can be more solidly made. On this basis, the type of quite 
generalised analysis we offer below is intended as a first step in impacting policy discussion around 
focussing attention on the broader value added/benefits of, for example, making buildings more 
energy efficient.    
4. Model and data 
We simulate the economy-wide and macroeconomic impacts of improving household energy 
efficiency using a variant of the UK CGE model UK-ENVI.8 For the specific application in this paper, we 
assume that investments are made by profit maximising forward-looking agents while (here five) 
representative households (distinguished as income quintile groups) are myopic. This intended to 
capture the notion that consumers do not behave as if they are all rational economic men, as is 
often assumed by economic modellers. In particular, households tend to be rather myopic, in contrast 
to firms, and base their spending decisions more on current income availability rather than on future 
discounted utility of consumption.9 In the following sections we provide a description of the main 
characteristics of the model.10 
4.1. Consumption  
We model the consumption decision of five representative households h as follows: 
 
In (1) total consumption C is a function of income YNG, savings SAV, income taxes HTAX, and taxes on 
consumption CTAX. 
At each period in time, each household allocates its consumption between energy used for residential 
purposes, EC, and non-energy and transport goods and services (including fuel use in personal 
transportation), TNEC, according to the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function: 
 
 
In  ? ? ?ɸ is the elasticity of substitution in consumption, and measures the extent to which consumers 
substitute residential energy consumption, EC, for non-energy and transport consumption, TNEC, ɷࣅ 
(0,1) is the share parameter, and ɶis the efficiency parameter for residential energy consumption. For 
                                                          
appliances may be a greater issue than heating/insulation) would have to be considered in any practical case 
study.  
8 UK-ENVI is a CGE modelling framework designed for the analysis of economic disturbances to the UK 
economy. The ENVI version is dedicated to the analysis of energy and environmental policies. 
9 It could be argued that lower income households are more myopic that higher income households. Although 
this is a reasonable observation, we decide to assume the same behaviour for all households given that a) we 
focus our attention on lower income households and b) long-run results are identical, regardless of the chosen 
dynamic. 
10 We provide the full mathematical description of the model in Appendix C. 
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simplicity (and in the absence of better information), in all households we impose a value, 0.61, for ɸ 
that is the long-run elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy estimated by Lecca et 
al. (2014).11 The consumption of residential energy includes electricity, gas and coal, as shown in 
Figure 1, although the share of coal consumed by households represents less than 0.01% of total 
energy consumption. Within the energy bundle, given that we do not focus on inter-fuel substitution 
in the analysis below, we impose a small but positive elasticity.  
 
 
4.2. Production and investment 
The production structure is characterised by a capital, labour, energy and materials (KLEM) nested CES 
function. As we show in Figure 2, the combination of labour and capital forms value added, while 
energy and materials form intermediate inputs. In turn, the combination of intermediate and value 
added forms total output in each sector.  
 
Following Hayashi (1982), we derive the optimal time path of investment by maximising the value of 
firms ௧ܸ, subject to a capital accumulation function  ܭሶ௧, so that:  
                                                          
11 However, we have conducted sensitivity analysis where we introduce different values for different 
household income groups. In particular, we introduced higher values for lower household income groups and 
vice versa. In comparison to the results reported in Section 4, we find that a higher elasticity triggers a larger 
rebound effect overall and in the households with higher elasticity. While the impact on overall GDP is not 
much changed (slightly reduced in the short run), as may be expected, there is a larger boost to disposable 
income in those groups with a higher elasticity, while the share of income spent on energy falls by less. 
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In (3), ߨ௧, is the firms profit, ܫ௧, is private investment, ݃(ݔ௧) is the adjustment cost function with ݔ௧ =ܫ௧ ܭ௧Τ   and ߜ is depreciation rate. The solution of the optimisation problem gives us the law of motion 
of the shadow price of capital, ߣ௧, and the adjusted Tobins q time path of investment (Hayashi, 1982). 
4.3. The labour market 
Wages are determined within the UK in an imperfect competition setting, according to the following 
wage curve: 
 
where the real consumption (after tax) wage is negatively related to the rate of unemployment 
(Blanchflower and Oswald 2009).  In (4), 
௪೟௖௣௜೟ is the real take home wage, ߮ is a parameter calibrated 
to the steady state, ߳ is the elasticity of wage related to the level of unemployment ݑ௧. The working 
population is assumed to be fixed and exogenous.  
4.2. Government 
The Government collects taxes and spends the revenue on a range of economic activities. We 
constrain the Government to maintain a constant budget balance. The aggregate fiscal deficit is taken 
to be fixed, so that any changes are constrained to be balanced budget in nature. The given fiscal 
deficit is maintained by either adjusting taxation or expenditure as illustrated in Equation (5):12 
 
 
 
In (5) GOVBAL is the government budget which is equal to the difference between government 
revenues from different sources, GY, and government spending GEXP. In the base year GOVBAL is 
negative, indicating a fiscal deficit that we assume to be fixed in our present analysis. 
We initially assume that the Government absorbs the budgetary impacts of any change in the 
economy by adjusting expenditure and keeping household income tax rates fixed. However, as 
explained below, we explore other cases, including where the Government fixes its expenditure and 
adjusts the income tax rate. 
4.3. Dataset: income disaggregation and energy use 
We calibrate the UK-ENVI CGE model on the UK Social Accounting Matrix for 2010.13 The data has 30 
different productive sectors14 including 4 main energy supply industries that encompass the supply of 
                                                          
12 This is a simplified version of Equation C.44 in Appendix C. 
13 The SAM is produced by the Fraser of Allander Institute and available for download at: 
http://www.strath.ac.uk/business/economics/fraserofallanderinstitute/research/economicmodelling/ 
14 See Appendix A, Table A.1 for the full list of sectors and the corresponding sectors in the 2010 UK IO table. 
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coal, refined oil, gas and electricity. We identify UK households, the UK Government, imports, exports 
and transfers to and from the rest of the World (ROW). 
 
As noted above (and explained in Appendix B), we disaggregate the household sector into 5 household 
income quintiles (HG), using the UK Living Costs and Food Survey. The income bands are described 
and related to weekly gross incomes in Table 1. 
Table 2 shows residential energy spending (on electricity, gas and coal) for each household as 
percentage of total energy consumption and of total consumption spending. 
 
As would be expected for a country with a colder climate like the UK, lower income household groups 
spend a greater share of their budget on energy. Moreover, the energy expenditure is mostly for 
residential (heating and lighting) use. As income increases, the share of energy in total expenditure 
decreases, and spending on fuels for transport increases. 
5. Simulation Scenarios 
As explained above (Section 3), the aim of the simulations in this paper is consider the general effects 
of delivering increased energy efficiency in different household income groups. For this reason, we 
focus on specifying and explaining simple and transparent scenarios, rather than attempting to detail 
and conduct simulations of particular policy options. We derive the impact of an illustrative 10% 
improvement in household residential energy use by exploring three main Scenarios. Each scenario is 
divided into two sub-scenarios: first, a, where we assume that the energy efficiency improvement 
occurs in all households, regardless of their income; then, b, where we assume that efficiency 
improves only in the energy use of the lowest income quintile household. From above, the latter case 
is identified as a priority focus for public spending where energy poverty is an issue of policy concern. 
In Scenario 1 we explore the impact of a 10% costless (and exogenously determined) improvement in 
household residential energy efficiency. This builds on the work of Lecca et al. (2014), extending that 
analysis to explore how the implications of the efficiency enhancement differ across the five income 
quintiles, and focussing only on energy used for heating and lighting (i.e. excluding refined fuel used 
in personal transportation).  
In Scenarios 2 and 3 we consider in broad terms different options for how Government may fund the 
increase in energy efficiency. Given that we do not have information about the likely cost of increasing 
household energy efficiency by 10% in UK, we simplify by assuming that the Government compensates 
for the difference in household energy expenditure before and after the efficiency increase, for a 
10 
 
limited time period (5 years). This is done by including in the expenditure items of its own budget, as 
shown in Equation (6).  
 
 
In order to keep the budget balanced when EC varies, the Government can either reduce its current 
expenditure, GEXP, or increase its income, GY. In the sixth period (year) after the efficiency 
improvement, we consider that it has been completely paid for and Equation (6) is replaced by its 
standard version described in (5).15  
Following this approach, in Scenario 2 we assume that a 10% household energy efficiency 
enhancement is funded via a temporary reallocation of Government spending. This effectively means 
that for five years the Government has to decrease its expenditure on other goods and services in 
order to spend on energy efficiency, while ensuring that the government balance is maintained in each 
period.  
In Scenario 3 we assume that a 10% household energy efficiency improvement is funded through a 
temporary rise in income tax. This implies that the Government is able to hold its current spending 
constant while balancing the budget through additional revenue. The focus on income tax is motivated 
in terms of the energy efficiency improvement being beneficial to households so that paying through 
tax provides an indirect way of having the household sector as a whole pay for increased efficiency in 
dwellings. However, there are distributional implications because higher income households pay more 
tax. Moreover, where only the lowest income household benefits from the energy efficiency 
improvement, the implication is that this is largely paid for by other households. In terms of the 
impacts on any economic expansion, introducing a change in income tax has important implications. 
This is because it triggers a change in supply side behaviour through the wage bargaining process, 
given that the after-tax or take-home wage, which is the focus of the bargaining process, is directly 
impacted. 
6. Results 
6.1. Costless improvement in household energy efficiency 
Table 3 shows the short and long-run impacts on key macroeconomic and energy use variables of a 
costless 10% increase in UK household energy efficiency for the two sub-scenarios: a. where the 
energy efficiency improvement occurs in all households (All HG); b. where efficiency improves only in 
the energy use of the lowest income quintile households (HG1).  
We report the results as percentage changes from the base year (SAM 2010) values, with the short-
run results referring to the first period (year) after the energy efficiency improvement takes place and 
the long-run referring to a conceptual time period where the capital stock is fully adjusted to a new 
steady-state equilibrium. Remember from Section 4 that we assume a fixed national labour supply, 
with a pool of unemployed labour and wage bargaining where there is a negative relationship between 
the unemployment rate and real after tax wage. 
                                                          
15 Again, we note that this is a simplifying assumption (and, unless the change in expenditure or tax is 
permanent, the number of periods assumed does not qualitatively impact our results below).  
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Beginning with Scenario 1a, where all UK households increase efficiency in residential energy, the first 
column in Table 3 shows that in the short run the switch in household expenditure away from spending 
on energy for heating and lighting towards other types of consumption has a small expansionary 
impact on the economy. Total GDP, consumption (disposable income after savings), employment, and 
investment increase by 0.03%, 0.52%, 0.05% and 1.14% respectively.  As the sectors involved (directly 
or indirectly) in supplying goods and services where demand has increased expand (off-set by 
contractions in energy supply chains), there is a corresponding stimulus to labour demand. This causes 
the unemployment rate to decrease by 0.82% while the nominal wage increases by 0.42%, which, with 
a CPI increase of 0.32%, equates to the 0.09% increase in the real wage. However, the increase in the 
CPI does lead to a decrease in total export demand of 0.49% while imports increase by 0.7%. 
Total household residential energy consumption falls by 2.35%, which, taking into account how a full 
range of economy-wide adjustments impact household income and consumption, is a large (76.5%) 
rebound on the 10% potential energy savings. That total household energy rebound is higher reflects 
increased spending on refined fuels for personal transportation. However, that the full economy-wide 
rebound is proportionately smaller (just under 69.9%) reflects that there is a net decrease in energy 
use on the production side of the economy (due to the contraction in energy supply activity).  
 
 
The long-run results for Scenario 1a, reported in the second column in Table 3, show household energy 
use remaining below its base-year value. That rebound effects are smaller in the long-run than in the 
short-run reflects the impact of disinvestment (Turner, 2009), or contraction in capacity, in energy 
supply on energy prices and consumption and production choices. There is a further (less energy-
intensive) expansion in GDP, with a long run increase of 0.16%. The expansion in the long run is greater 
than in the short run because the ability for all production sectors to adjust capacity allows a greater 
response to the net positive demand stimulus from increase real household income reallocated to 
other goods and services. However, given that the total labour force is assumed to be fixed, there is a 
fall in the unemployment rate generating an increase in the real wage. This, in turn, puts continued 
(but declining) upward pressure on all commodity prices and reduces competitiveness so that there is 
a lasting decrease in export demand (-0.37%).   
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The third and fourth columns of Table 3 show the corresponding results if we limit the increase in 
energy efficiency to the lowest income quintile, Household Group 1 (HG1). The long-run results are 
qualitatively the same as found in Scenario 1a, but the scale of both the economic expansion and the 
contraction in total household energy use is much smaller. In the short-run, crowding out effects 
impacting exports and disinvestment in the energy supply sectors actually causes a very small net 
negative impact in GDP (-0.001%).16 The core issue is that the lowest income quintile, where spending 
power is directly boosted by the energy efficiency improvement, is only a very small source of 
consumption expenditure in the UK economy. This group is also not a huge beneficiary of increased 
labour and capital income when the expansion occurs. This means that further induced multiplier 
rounds of spending come largely from the other household income groups, and this is limited in the 
very small expansion reported.17  
Indeed if we refer to the long-run results for the change in household disposable income net of savings 
(i.e. consumption spending) in Tables 4a and 4b, note that around 85% of the increase enjoyed by HG1 
when energy efficiency improves in all households is retained in the case where only HG1 Increases 
its efficiency. On the other hand, comparison of the GDP results in the second and fourth columns of 
Table 3 show that the long-run GDP increase under Scenario 1b is only around 10% of what is realised 
when all households improve their energy efficiency.  
  
Comparison of the results in scenarios 1a and 1b reported in Table 4 show that residential energy use 
in the lowest household income group falls most, as does the share of consumption spending on this 
energy use, when the efficiency improvement is targeted only in HG1. This is because the rebound in 
energy use is smaller where there is a more limited boost to household income. However, Table 3 has 
shown that the total reduction in UK households and economy-wide energy use is smaller (i.e. 
rebound is larger) under Scenario 1b when the efficiency improvement is limited to HG1. This is 
because the other households do not experience an improvement in efficiency and slightly increase 
their energy consumption with the (very limited) economic expansion.   
                                                          
16 However, sensitivity analysis shows that if the proportionate increase in energy efficiency is larger, here 
14%, this is sufficient to make the short-run increase in GDP slightly positive (0.003%, but with the long-run 
impact, although very slightly larger, remaining the same to the two decimal places in Table 3). 
17 We have run alternative simulations where the other income quintiles are in turn each the recipients of the 
energy efficiency increase. In all other cases the positive stimulus from their boosted and reallocated spending 
is sufficient to generate a positive expansion from the outset.    
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The conclusion that can be drawn is that more extensive energy efficiency stimuli can deliver a fuller 
set of desired outcomes. This includes achieving reductions in energy use through energy efficiency 
and (by implication from reduced energy use) carbon reduction targets, boosting household income 
in low (and other) income households, along with wider economic expansion. However, so far we have 
not given any consideration to how increased energy efficiency may be funded. Therefore, in the next 
section, we report on extended simulations where we incorporate a basic consideration of the impacts 
of applying some treatment of cost via the public budget.  
 
 
6.2. Basic options for funding improvements in household energy efficiency via the Government 
budget 
First, let us consider the case of effecting some payment for the introduction of the energy efficiency 
improvement through a temporary reallocation of government expenditure, in the manner detailed 
above in Section 5 (Scenarios 2a and 2b).18 The main impact of the required reduction in Government 
spending in other areas of the economy is a short run contraction in economic activity (reflected in 
the GDP results over time in Figure 3). The contraction in activity actually continues for less than the 
assumed 5-year period of required reallocation of government expenditure. This is because firms are 
forward looking (i.e. they know that the contraction in spending will end) and they adjust their 
investment plans accordingly.  
At the level of the different household income groups, in Scenario 2a, where all households improve 
their energy efficiency, the short-run impact is a slightly smaller boost to consumption (disposable 
income net of savings) but with the gap relative to the no cost Scenario 1a being larger in higher 
income groups where labour and capital incomes are more important. In Scenario 2b, where energy 
efficiency only increases in the lowest income quintile, the impact for HG1 remains more or less 
unchanged relative to Scenario 1b. However, all other groups now experience a slight contraction in 
their income used for consumption (-0-01% in HG2&3 and -0.02% in HG4&5).  
The key finding, however, is that the long-run results under Scenarios 2a and 2b are unchanged 
relative to the costless case in Scenarios 1a and 1b. 
                                                          
18 The long run results under Scenarios 2 and 3 are generally not very different to what is observed in Scenario 
1 so we do not provide equivalent tables, instead focussing on key results in the figures below. 
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On the other hand, when we consider the case of a temporary increase in the income tax rate 
(Scenarios 3a and 3b) there are more marked changes in the nature of the results. First, as noted in 
Section 5, the change in income tax brings about a change in the supply side of the economy. This is 
because the increase in taxation reduces the take home wage, causing workers to demand higher 
salaries, putting upward pressure on the real wage and thereby impacting costs faced by all firms. 
While Figure 3 shows a very close convergence in long-run GDP under Scenario 3a, there are some 
minor differences in the long-run impacts on GDP, investment and employment/unemployment.    
 
 
However, there is a greater impact on results when the energy efficiency improvement is limited to 
HG1 in Scenario 3b. First, Figure 4 shows that there is a small contraction in GDP that lasts into the 
long run (-0.005%). This implies that the increase in energy efficiency in HG1 does not provide a 
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sufficient economic stimulus to demand to deliver a long-run expansion in the presence of the adverse 
supply-side shock that is delivered via the induced rise in wage demands.19  
Moreover, while the impact on income used for consumption is very similar in Scenario 3b (as 
compared to 3a) under the government spending and tax options for HG1 (only slightly worse under 
the latter), it is very different for all the other household income groups. Initially, given that they pay 
more income tax, HG2-5, effectively pay for the increase in HG1 energy efficiency through their 
increased tax contributions. However, over time, even once the tax rate returns to its original level, 
the other groups continue to pay through the greater impact on their disposable (net of savings) 
incomes from the economic contraction. This is shown in Figure 5.  Note that the biggest loser is the 
highest income quintile, HG5. This is due to the fact that income from ownership of capital (most 
important in HG5) is adversely affected in this scenario due to more limited investment activity. 
We have run a specific sensitivity scenario where we increase the size of the energy efficiency 
improvement in HG1 to see what is required to produce a positive GDP result over the long-run under 
the income tax funding scenario. We find that a 12% boost to the residential energy use in HG1 is 
sufficient to deliver a net positive (0.0003%) increase in GDP over the long run, with the positive result 
emerging from period 11. However, the net negative impact on disposable income in the other 
household groups persists, albeit to a lesser extent. We find that, where we have an income tax 
funding arrangement as above, a doubling of the efficiency improvement in HG1 residential energy 
use to 20% is required to remove the long-run negative impacts on the disposable income of all other 
groups. Below this, the highest income household remains most affected, for example with only HG5 
losing out over the long run where the efficiency improvement in HG1 is 19%.     
 
Overall, the results above suggest that imposing a cost for increasing energy efficiency via the public 
budget will constrain the multiple benefits of increased energy efficiency at least in the shorter run. 
                                                          
19 However, again, we find that if any other household group is the sole beneficiary of the energy efficiency 
improvement, the resulting stimulus is sufficient to deliver a net expansion in GDP, and that this is more so the 
higher the income level of the group in question.  
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However, if the economic expansion is sufficiently big, the long-run outcome is one of net gain in 
broader economic impacts. When the efficiency improvement is targeted only in the lowest income 
households this does deliver the desired outcomes for that group, but it weakens the economic 
expansion, while the need for (and nature of) public funding through the government budget becomes 
much more important. 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
Many recent economic modelling studies of increased energy efficiency have tended to focus on the 
issue of rebound effects. However, in considering economy-wide rebound in particular, some studies 
have identified economic expansion resulting from increased energy efficiency as the driver of 
rebound, a finding that is consistent with the type of Multiple Benefits argument proposed by the 
IEA (2014). Here, we have focused our attention on how the economic expansion may provide a 
justification for public/government support of energy efficiency programmes.  
Specifically, we have used an illustrative CGE modelling analysis for the UK to consider the general 
effects of government support of domestic energy efficiency programmes. We have raised the 
question of whether only low income households should be aided in improving their energy efficiency, 
or whether there is sufficient return through expansion to justify potentially supporting wider ranging 
programmes. A key point that we have raised is that many governments are committed to the support 
of energy efficiency programmes but may focus this in low income households. However, 
Governments tend to have a wider set of desired outcomes, including reduced energy use and carbon 
emissions, but also in terms of reducing poverty (including but not limited to energy poverty) and 
increasing economic well-being, in part through GDP and employment growth.   
In considering scenarios where support is provided only for the lowest income households to increase 
their energy efficiency, our findings suggest that it is likely to be difficult to meet all of governments 
objectives simultaneously through limited support of households that are significantly less connected 
to the wider economy than others (in terms of their level of spending and their sources of income). 
Our own results suggest that in order to stimulate economic activity by this route quite large 
proportionate increases in residential energy efficiency in low income household need to be achieved.  
In contrast, where the introduction of increased energy efficiency is spread over all (or at least a wider 
range) of households, even where there is a cost to supporting energy efficiency improvements, the 
return via the impacts of economic expansion is likely to provide what justification for support.  
However, our findings suggest that the means of providing support for energy efficiency programmes 
should be carefully considered and examined. Our results imply that a reallocation of government 
spending will be less distortive than requiring the household sector to pay indirectly (according to 
ability to pay) via income tax. However, we reserve fuller consideration of specific funding mechanisms 
for future research, ideally in consultation with policy decision makers particularly within the UK.  
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Appendix A. Industries included in the UK-ENVI model 
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Appendix B. Disaggregation of 2010 UK SAM household sector 
For the purposes of this work, we disaggregate the 2010 UK SAM household sector by income 
quintiles20, following the approach adopted by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) in its Family 
Spending publication, which reports the findings of the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS; Office for 
National Statistics 2011, 2012, 2013). Each of the quintiles refer the weekly gross income reported in 
Table 2 in Section 4.3. 
We disaggregate the UK SAM in three distinct steps: 1) disaggregation of household spending on goods 
and services (via the IO tables incorporated in the SAM); 2) disaggregation of non-IO household 
expenditure and of income; 3) rebalance of the SAM.  
1. The 2010 Input Output reports household expenditure on the outputs of each of the 104 
production sectors included in the UK tables. To disaggregate household consumption we 
use information from the LCFS, which reports household consumption for different 
income group. To avoid any errors that could be driven by the sample size and/or the 
socio-economic conditions during a specific year, we use 3-year average figures from 2009 
to 2011 (Office from National Statistics 2011, 2012, 2013).  We map the 12 spending 
categories reported in the table of derived household variables from the LCFS to the 
household final consumption expenditure (HHFCe) which is included in the IO table. This 
allows us to calculate for each spending category, the proportion of each income quintiles 
expenditure on each group. Finally, we multiply the shares of each quintiles expenditure 
by the household consumption as reported in the UK SAM to obtain a disaggregated 
picture of the household final consumption for each of the quintiles and each of the SAM 
sectors. 
2. In addition to the IO table, the 2010 UK SAM includes information on income transfers not 
included in the IO accounts drawn from elsewhere in the UK national accounts. We again 
use the LCFS to disaggregate household income from different sources, including the 
employment and capital income that are reflected (to some extent in the IO data) and 
transfers to and from government and non-government institutions, corporations, the 
rest of the world, and the capital accounts. As in the first step, we again use figures 
averaged over three years (Office from National Statistics 2011, 2012, 2013). 
3. Disaggregating household income and expenditure leads to imbalances within each of the 
household quintiles. Therefore, it is necessary to manually re-balance the SAM so that we 
do not disrupt the integrity of the rest of the matrix. We do so by allocating any 
discrepancies between the rows and the columns of each quintile to the capital formation 
(savings/borrowing) entry for each quintile.  
                                                          
20 The UK Family Spending survey reports deciles so we must merge over pair of deciles to create quintiles. 
Appendix C The mathematical presentation of the
UK-ENVI model
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KSi,t=1 = KSi,t=0 (C.72)
LSi,t=1 = LSi,t=0 (C.73)
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GDi,t=1 = GDi,t=0 (C.74)
Di,t=1 = Di,t=0 (C.75)
C.1 Glossary
Set
i, j i = j the set of goods or industries
ins the set of institutions
dins(⊂ ins) the set of domestic institutions
dngins(⊂ dins) the set of non-government institutions
fins(⊂ dins) the set of foreign institutions
E(⊂ i) the set of energy sectors Electricity, Gas, Oil and Coal
NE(⊂ i) the set of non–energy
Prices
PYi,t value added price
PRi,t regional price
PQi,t output price
PIRi,t national commodity price(regional+RUK)
wt unified nominal wage
wbt after tax wage
rki,t rate of return to capital
Pkt capital good price
UCKt user cost of capital
λt shadow price of capital
Pct aggregate consumption price
Pkt aggregate price of Government consumption goods
Pkt exchange rage (fixed)
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Endogenous variables
Xi,t total output
Ri,t regional supply
Mi,t total import
Ei,t total export (interregional+regional)
Yi,t value added
Li,t labour demand
Ki,t physical capital demand
KSi,t capital stock
LSi,t labour supply
V Vi,j,t total intermediate inputs
Vi,t total intermediate inputs in i
V Ri,j,t regional intermediate inputs
VMi,j,t ROW intermediate inputs
V IRi,j,t national intermediate inputs (Scotland+RUK)
V Ii,j,t RUK intermediate inputs
Gt aggregate Government expenditure
QGi,t Government expenditure by sector i
QGRi,t regional Government expenditure by sector i
QGMi,t national Government expenditure by sector i
Ch,t aggregate household consumption
ECh,t household consumption of energy
TNECh,t household consumption of non-energy and transport goods
QHh,i,t household consumption by sector i
QHRh,i,t household regional consumption by sector i
QHIRh,i,t regional+RUK consumption by sector i
QHMh,i,t imported consumption bys sector i
QVh,i,t total investment by sector of origin i
QV Ri,t regional investment by sector of origin i
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QIRi,t ROW investment demand by sector i
QV Ii,t RUK investment demand by sector i
Ij,t investment by sector of destination j
Jj,t investment by destination j with adjustment cost
ut regional unemployment rate
uNt national unemployment rate
Rki,t marginal revenue of capital
St domestic non-government savings
Trft household net transfer
Trsfdngins,dnginsp,t transfer among dngins
HTAXt total household tax
TBt current account balance
Exogenous variables
REM t remittance for dngins
FEt remittance for Government
GSAVt Government savings
r interest rate
Elasticities
σ constant elasticity of marginal utility
ρXi elasticity of substitution between intermediate and value added
ρYi elasticity of substitution between capital and labour
ρAi elasticity of substitution in Armington function
σxi elasticity of export with respect to term trade
σei substitution in consumption between energy and non-energy
σgi substitution in consumption between CO and EG
σoi substitution in consumption between coal and oil
σeli substitution in consumption between electricity and gas
Parameters
αVi,j input-output coefficients for i used in j
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αYj share of value added in production
δY,Vj share in CES output function in sector j
δk,lj share in value added function in sector j
δvir,vm,vr,vii,j share in CES function for intermediate goods
δqvvir,qvm,qvr,qvii,j share in CES function for investment
δe,neh,i,j share in CES function for household consumption
δhr,hmh,i,j share in CES function for household consumption
δgr,gmi,j share in CES function for Government consumption
γvv,viri,j shift paramenter in CES for intermediate goods
γfh,i shift paramenter in CES for household consumption
γgi shift paramenter in CES for Government consumption
btaxi rate of business tax
KMi,j physical capital matrix
mps rate of saving dngins
τ rate of income tax
ρ pure rate of consumer time preference
bb rate of distortion or incentive to invest
δ depreciation rate
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